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PUBLIC POLICY BEYOND THE HEADLINES
Giandomenico Majone
European U n iv e r s i t y  In s t i t u t e ,  F lo ren ce ,  I t a l y 1 .
P o l i c y  an a ly s ts  know th a t  i t  i s  im poss ib le  t o  study po l icy -m ak ing  
w i t h o u t  t a k i n g  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  th e  r o l e  o f  th e  media in  
in f lu e n c in g  p u b l ic  op in ion ,  sh ap in g  i s s u e s ,  s e t t i n g  th e  p u b l i c  
agenda , d i f f u s i n g  id e a s  and f a c i l i t a t i n g  communication w ith in  
p o l i c y  com m u n it ie s .  E m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  h a v e  shown t h a t  t h e  
p u b l i c ' s  a t t e n t io n  to  p o l i c y  issues  fo l lo w s  ra th e r  c l o s e l y  media 
c o v e r a g e  o f  th o s e  i s s u e s .  A c c o rd in g  t o  o t h e r  s t u d i e s ,  m ed ia  
a t t e n t io n  t o  an is su e  a f f e c t s  a ls o  the  a t t e n t io n  o f  po licym akers ,  
p a r t l y  because p o l i t i c i a n s  f o l l o w  mass media l i k e  o t h e r  p e o p l e ,  
and p a r t l y  because media a f f e c t  t h e i r  c on s t i tu en ts .
However, t h i s  acknowledgement o f  the  importance o f  th e  media in  
t h e  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s  i s  n o t  f r e e  f r om  c r i t i c a l  o v e r t o n e s .  A 
fr equ en t  c r i t i c i s m  concerns the  p r e s s 's  tendency t o  c o ve r  a s to r y  
p r o m in e n t ly  f o r  a sh o r t  p e r iod  o f  time and then turn t o  th e  next 
s t o r y ,  d i lu t in g  i t s  impact and perhaps c o n fu s in g  th e  p u b l i c .  I t  
i s  a ls o  a l l e g e d  th a t  in  t h e i r  r e p o r t in g  j o u r n a l i s t s  o f t e n  f a i l  t o  
d is t in g u is h  between important and t r i v i a l  i s s u e s , between c r u c ia l  
and m a rg in a l  p o l i c y  changes. Again, one o f t e n  has the  im press ion  
t h a t  e v e n  j o u r n a l i s t s  s p e c i a l i s i n g  i n  i s s u e s  l i k e  t h e  
en v iro n m en t ,  consumer p r o t e c t io n  o r  h ea lth  p o l i c y  tend t o  mix up 
what i s  d e s i r a b le  and what i s  f e a s ib l e .
1. Paper  p r e s e n te d  a t  the In t e rn a t io n a l  Symposium on M id-Career 




























































































Even i f  these  c r i t i c i s m s  are  not always j u s t i f i e d ,  they  do po in t  
to  a se r iou s  gap in  the  p r o fe s s io n a l  t r a in in g  o f  j o u r n a l i s t s .  I t  
i s  u n l i k e l y  th a t  a l i t e r a r y  or  musical c r i t i c  could  w r i t e  f o r  an 
important newspaper w ithou t h a v in g  f i r s t  a c q u ir e d  c o n s id e r a b l e  
know ledge  in  th e  r e l e v a n t  a r t i s t i c  f i e l d .  But I  doubt th a t  many 
jo u r n a l i s t s  who cove r  p o l i c y  issues have an adequate t r a i n i n g  in  
p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s .  T h is  t r a i n i n g  i s  o b v i o u s l y  l a c k in g  in  many 
cou n tr ie s  o f  Europe where the academic study o f  p u b l ic  p o l i c y  i s  
s t i l l  i n  i t s  i n f a n c y .  But e v e n  w h e re  p o l i c y  s t u d i e s  a r e  
reasonably  w e l l  d e v e lo p e d ,  no s e r i o u s  e f f o r t  has been made t o  
show how s c h o l a r l y  r e s e a r c h  can c on tr ib u te  to  a more p e r c e p t iv e  
coverage o f  p o l i c y  developments.
The main t h e s i s  o f  t h i s  paper  i s  n o t  t h a t  j o u r n a l i s t s  should 
become p o l i c y  an a ly s ts ,  but th a t  they shou ld  l e a r n  enough about 
th e  d i s c i p l i n e  to  be ab le  to  a c t i v e l y  c on tr ib u te  t o  the process  
o f  c r i t i c i s m  and a p p r a i s a l  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s  so e s s e n t i a l  t o  
d e m o c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s .  The r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  a c a d e m ic  p o l i c y  
resea rch er  t o  th e  j o u r n a l i s t  shou ld  be s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  th e  
l i t e r a r y  s c h o la r  to  the "p u b l ic  c r i t i c "  whose task , accord ing  to  
N o r th rop  F r y e ,  i s  t o  e x e m p l i f y  how a man o f  t a s t e  u s e s  and 
e v a lu a t e s  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and thus t o  show how l i t e r a t u r e  i s  to  be 
absorbed in to  s o c i e t y .  The a n a lo g y  i s  l e s s  f a r - f e t c h e d  than i t  
m igh t seem a t  f i r s t :  as I  have shown elsewhere  (Majone, 1989), 
p o l i c y  a n a ly s is  should be thought o f  as th e  r h e t o r i c  o f  p o l i c y ­
making .
The M iss ing  Link: P o l i c y  C r i t i c i s m
During the l a s t  th re e  o r  fou r  decades the study o f  po licy -m ak ing  
has made s i g n i f i c a n t ,  some would say sp ec ta cu la r ,  advances a lo n g  
s e v e r a l  f r o n t s :  t e c h n iq u e s  o f  a n a l y s i s ,  g en era l  t h e o r i e s ,  case 
s tu d ies  and p o l i c y  h i s t o r i e s  and, l a s t  bu t c e r t a i n l y  n o t  l e a s t ,  




























































































im press ive  p r o g r e s s ,  one c r u c i a l  l i n k  i s  s t i l l  m is s in g  in  th e  
c h a in  fo rm  p o l i c y  i n i t i a t i o n  t o  p u b l i c  a p p r a i s a l  o f  p o l i c y  
outcomes. Th is m iss ing  l in k  i s  p o l i c y  c r i t i c i s m  in  th e  sen se  o f  
F r y e 's  "p u b l ic  c r i t i c i s m " .
As the author o f  Anatomy o f  C r i t i c i s m  has so p o w e r fu l l y  a rgued , 
c r i t i c i s m  i s  a s t ru c tu re  o f  thought and knowledge e x i s t i n g  in  i t s  
own r i g h t ,  w i th  some measure o f  independence  from  th e  a r t  i t  
d e a ls  w i t h .  The c r i t i c  i s  n o t  a p a r a s i t e  o r  a r t i s t  manqué. but 
the p ion ee r  o f  education  and the shaper o f  c u l tu r a l  t r a d i t i o n .  A 
p u b l i c  t h a t  t r i e s  t o  do w i th o u t  c r i t i c i s m ,  and a s s e r t s  th a t  i t  
knows what i t  wants o r  l i k e s ,  b r u ta l i s e s  th e  a r t s  and l o s e s  i t s  
c u l tu ra l  memory (F rye ,  1957: 3 -8 ) .
S im i la r l y ,  we c o u ld  sa y ,  a c i t i z e n r y  t h a t  does  n o t  c u l t i v a t e  
p o l i c y  c r i t i c i s m s ,  o r  r e d u c e s  i t  t o  a mere c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  
persona l b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s ,  b r u t a l i s e s  th e  d e m o c ra t ic  p r o c e s s  
and l o s e s  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  memory. In  f a c t ,  c r i t i c a l  debate  i s  so 
much a t  t h e  h e a r t  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  p o l i t i c s  and p o l i c y  t h a t  
dem ocracy  has been c a l l e d  a system o f  government by d iscu ss ion .  
P o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s ,  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ,  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  t h e  
e x e c u t iv e ,  the  cou r ts ,  the media, in t e r e s t  groups and independent 
e x p e r ts ,  a l l  engage in  a continuous process o f  debate  and mutual 
persuasion . Pu b l ic  d iscuss ion  m ob i l is e s  the knowledge, exper ien ce  
and i n t e r e s t  o f  many peop le ,  w h i le  fo cu ss in g  t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  on a 
l im i t e d  range o f  is su es .  Each p a r t i c ip a n t  i s  encouraged t o  ad jus t  
h is  v iew  o f  r e a l i t y ,  and even to  change h i s  v a lu e s ,  as a r e s u l t  
o f  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  d eb a te  and p e rsu a s io n .  In t h i s  way, c r i t i c a l  
d iscu ss ion  can produce r e s u l t s  th a t  are  beyond th e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  
o f  a u th o r i ta r ia n  o r  te ch n o c ra t ic  methods o f  po l icy -m ak ing .
However, the  e x t r a o r d in a r y  p o t e n t i a l  o f  p u b l i c  d e b a te  can be 
r e a l i s e d  on ly  i f  c i t i z e n s  are  w e l l  informed and i f  t h e i r  c r i t i c a l  




























































































i n c r e a s in g  com p lex i ty  o f  po licy -m ak ing  these  two co n d i t io n s ,  and 
e s p e c ia l l y  the l a t t e r ,  are not e a s i l y  s a t i s f i e d .  S t a t i s t i c i a n s ,  
economists, s o c i o l o g i s t s  and o th e r  p o l i c y  ana lys ts  la y  down t h e i r  
m a te r ia ls  ou ts id e  the  p o r ta ls  o f  the  forum o f  p u b l ic  d e b a te ,  but 
t h e  a v e r a g e  c i t i z e n  i s  u n a b le  t o  d i s t i l  sound c r i t e r i a  o f  
e va lu a t ion  from the growing mass o f  data and in f o r m a t i o n .  I t  i s  
th e  ta s k  o f  th e  p o l i c y  c r i t i c  to  use the m a te r ia ls  assembled by 
th e  s p e c i a l i s t s  t o  make p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i n t e l l i g i b l e  and th u s  
a c c e s s ib le  to  la y  e va lu a t ion .
The c o m p l e x i t y  o f  p o l i c y - m a k i n g  r e f l e c t s  t h e  g r o w i n g  
in te rd e p e n d e n c e  o f  p o l i c y  f i e l d s  th a t  used t o  be t r e a t e d  almost 
in  i s o l a t i o n  from each o the r .  Today, economic p o l i c y  i s  c l o s e l y  
l i n k e d  t o  s o c i a l  p o l i c y ,  t r a d e  p o l i c y  t o  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  
environmental p o l i c y  to  in d u s t r ia l  p o l i c y .  The dom estic  p o l i c i e s  
o f  th e  member s t a t e s  o f  the European Community can no lon ge r  be 
understood w ithout r e f e r e n c e  t o  Community p o l i c i e s .  I n c r e a s in g  
p o l i c y  in t e r d e p e n d e n c e  has l e d  t o  a p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  h y b r id  
la b e ls  l i k e  " f o r e i g n  economic p o l i c y " ,  and o f  a n a ly t i c  c a t e g o r ie s  
l i k e  " p o l i c y  s p a c e " .  The l a t t e r  denotes  a s e t  o f  p o l i c i e s  tha t  
a re  so c l o s e l y  i n t e r r e l a t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  make 
u s e fu l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  o r  a n a ly t i c  statements about one o f  them 
w ithout tak in g  the o th e r  elements o f  the s e t  in to  account.
P u b l i c  p o l i c y  i s  n o t  o n l y  c o m p le x  b u t  a l s o  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
a b s t r a c t .  A l l  t h e  s o c i a l  and e c o n o m ic  i n d i c a t o r s  w h ic h  
p o l i c y m a k e r s  use t o  a s sess  th e  magnitude o f  a p rob lem  o r  t o  
d e t e c t  changes in  the  problem, are the product o f  d e f i n i t i o n  and 
c o n v e n t io n .  The use fu lness  o f  measures o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  p roduction , 
e d u c a t i o n ,  h e a l t h  o r  c r im e  d e p e n d s  e n t i r e l y  on  a c l e a r  
r e c o g n i t io n  o f  t h e i r  conven t iona l  ch a rac te r .  Such in fo rm ation  can 
e a s i l y  m is le a d  th e  unwary  c i t i z e n  i f  i t  i s  n o t  c r i t i c a l l y  
in t e rp r e t e d  in  r e l a t i o n  to  a s p e c i f i c  c on tex t .  In  sh o r t ,  economic 




























































































" f a c t s "  o r  p h y s i c a l  m easu rem en ts  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  a d i r e c t  
apprehension o f  some n a tu ra l  phenomenon. In  A l l a n  C o d d in g t o n ' s 
a p t  p h ra s e ,  one cannot, even w ith  good e y e s ig h t ,  go out in t o  the 
T r e a s u ry  s t e p s  and o b s e r v e  t h e  d o m e s t i c  l e v e l  o f  e c o n o m ic  
a c t i v i t y .  R a th e r  "econom ic  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  
bu reaucra t ic  compounding o f  enormous g u a n t i t i e s  o f  f r a g m e n ta r y  
and even  ambiguous p i e c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n :  th e  components a re  
thrown up as a r e s u l t  ( o r  even as a b y -p rod u c t  ) o f  th e  g e n e r a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  o f  s o c i e t y ,  from  t a x - r e t u r n s ,  sample 
su rveys , censuses, and so on; th e  components a re  a ssem b led  and 
a g g r e g a t e d  by teams o f  s t a t i s t i c i a n s  who have n o t  th e m s e lv e s  
c o l l e c t e d  the in fo rm a t ion "  (Coddington, 1969: 823).
Thus, t o  r e tu r n  t o  our metaphor o f  l i t e r a r y  c r i t i c i s m ,  i t  i s  
s im p ly  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  ( p o l i c y )  c r i t i c i s m  i s  a r t i f i c i a l  and 
u n tu to r e d  p u b l i c  t a s t e  ( o p in i o n )  n a t u r a l ,  as p o p u l i s t s  o f  a l l  
s t r ip e s  would have i t .  Because i t  i s  complex and a b s t ra c t ,  p o l i c y  
canno t  be d i r e c t l y  apprehended , bu t can on ly  be understood and 
appra ised  w ith  th e  h e lp  o f  a c r i t i c a l  a p p a ra tu s .  To r a i s e  th e  
s tan d a rd s  o f  p u b l ic  debate i s  the p e c u l ia r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the 
p o l i c y  c r i t i c .  He i s  the  e s s e n t ia l  l in k  between the  p r a c t i c a l  and 
t h e o r e t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  r e la t e d  to  po licy -m ak ing ,  on the  one hand, 
and p u b l ic  op in ion  on the  o ther .
The P a t te rn  o f  P o l i c y
In  o r d e r  t o  e v a l u a t e  p o l i c y  c o m p e t e n t l y ,  and  make i t  
i n t e l l i g i b l e  t o  a broad audience, the  p o l i c y  c r i t i c  must r e l y  on 
m a te r ia ls  p rov ided  by s p e c ia l i s e d  re s ea rch .  In  th e  r em a in d e r  o f  
t h i s  p a p e r  I  s h a l l  a t t e m p t  t o  g i v e  an id e a  o f  th e  p rob lem s  
in v e s t i g a t e d  by p o l i c y  resea rch e rs .  Needless t o  say, my ch o ic e  o f  
t o p ic s  i s  h ig h ly  s e l e c t i v e  and id io s y n c r a t i c ;  I  tend to  emphasise 
c o u n t e r - in tu i t i v e  conc lus ions  ra th e r  than r e s u l t s  wh ich  seem t o  




























































































f o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  and  
a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  The p o l i c y / a d m in is t r a t io n  dichotomy was used in  
th e  p a s t  t o  su p p o r t  th e  d o c t r in e  t h a t  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  make 
p o l i c y  w h i l e  th e  t a s k  o f  a d m in is t r a t o r s  and exper ts  i s  to  f in d  
th e  a p p r o p r ia t e  means t o  im plem ent i t .  The d o c t r i n e  im p l i e s ,  
among o th e r  th in g s ,  th a t  the problem o f  adm in is tra t ion  i s ,  pu re ly  
and s im ply , one o f  c o n t r o l l in g  d i s c r e t i o n ,  s in c e  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  
d i s c r e t i o n  can be used as a cover  f o r  a r b i t r a r y  behaviour th a t  i s  
u n r e l a t e d  t o  p o l i c y  i n t e n t i o n s .  But how can  o n e  c o n t r o l  
d i s c r e t i o n ?  Unless one i s  w i l l i n g  to  assume th a t  p o l i c i e s  sp r ing  
f u l l y  armed from  th e  f o r e h e a d  o f  an o m n is c ie n t  p o l i c y m a k e r ,  
d i s c r e t i o n  i s  bo th  i n e v i t a b l e  and n e c e s s a r y .  We r e q u i r e  th e  
im poss ib le  when we expect  our bureaucrats t o  be a t  th e  same t im e  
l i t e r a l  e x e cu to rs  and success fu l  implementers o f  p o l i c y  mandates 
(Majone and W ildavsky, 1979).
The p r o b le m  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n ,  so  c e n t r a l  t o  
democratic a c c o u n ta b i l i t y ,  appears in  a new l i g h t  once we r e a l i s e  
t h a t  i t  i s  no t  the  case th a t  p o l i c y  s e t t l e s  e v e ry th in g  down t o  a 
c e r t a in  p o in t  w h i le  a d m in is t r a t io n  d e a ls  w i th  e v e r y t h in g  b e low  
t h a t  p o i n t . P o l i c y  and adm in is tra t ion  do not occupy two separa te  
sp h e res  o f  a c t i o n  but i n t e r a c t  th rou gh ou t  th e  e n t i r e  p o l i c y ­
making p rocess .
One reason why i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  in  p r a c t i c e  t o  s e p a r a t e  p o l i c y  
from  a d m in i s t r a t i o n  i s  t h a t  l e g i s l a t i v e  mandates are  o f t e n  so 
vagu e ,  ambiguous, o r  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  no c l e a r  
s tan d a rd s  f o r  adm in is tra to rs  and exper ts  t o  app ly . Even when the 
s ta tu te s  attempt t o  d e f in e  goa ls  w ith  g r e a t  p r e c i s io n ,  a v a i l a b l e  
t e c h n i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  k n o w le d g e  may be i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
in d ic a t e  ways t h a t  unam biguously  a c h ie v e  th o s e  g o a l s .  Because 
u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  so p e r v a s i v e  in  p o l i c y - m a k in g ,  th e  v a lu e s  o f  
a d m in i s t r a t o r s  and e x p e r t s  i n e v i t a b l y  coun t a g o o d  d e a l .  I t  




























































































such as p r o f e s s i o n a l  norms and p e e r  r e v i e w ,  w h ich  ta k e  th o s e  
va lues  in t o  c o n s id e ra t io n .
P o l i c y  resea rch e rs  u su a l ly  b reak  down th e  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s  i n t o  
d i s t i n c t  s ta g e s  which th ey  ana lyse  s e q u e n t ia l l y :  agenda s e t t i n g ,  
p rob lem  f o r m u la t i o n ,  com par ison  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  d e c i s i o n ,  
im p le m e n ta t io n ,  e v a lu a t i o n .  Such a breakdown i s  a n a l y t i c a l l y  
u s e fu l  bu t  sh ou ld  n o t  be  t a k e n  l i t e r a l l y ,  as  shown by  o u r  
d i s c u s s io n  o f  th e  p o l i c y / a d m in i s t r a t i o n  dichotomy. In  r e a l i t y ,  
p o l icy -m ak ing  i s  a seamless u n ity  o r ,  more p r e c i s e l y ,  a c i r c u l a r  
p r o c e s s  and  any  a t t e m p t  t o  s e gm en t  i t  i s  t o  some e x t e n t  
a r t i f i c i a l .  F o r  exam p le ,  i t  seems i n t u i t i v e l y  o b v i o u s  t h a t  
im p lem en ta t io n  should f o l l o w ,  l o g i c a l l y  and c h r o n o lo g i c a l l y ,  the 
p o l i c y  d e c is io n .
Now , i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d e c i s i o n  s h a p e s  t h e  
implementation process  by d e f in in g  the arena in  which th e  process  
ta k e s  p l a c e ,  th e  i d e n t i t y  and r o l e  o f  the  p r in c ip a l  a c t o r s ,  the 
range o f  p e rm is s ib le  t o o l s  o f  a c t io n ,  and o f  course  by s u p p ly in g  
r e s o u r c e s .  But i t  i s  a l s o  t r u e  t h a t  im p le m e n ta t io n  shapes and 
o f t e n  m o d i f i e s  th e  p o l i c y .  T h is  i s  because  many c o n s t r a i n t s  
rem ain  h id d en  in  th e  p la n n in g  s t a g e  and are  d is c o v e r e d  o n ly  in  
the  implementation  s ta g e .  Moreover, f e a s i b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  keep  
ch a n g in g  o v e r  t im e :  o l d  c o n s t r a in t s  d i s a p p e a r  o r  a re  overcome 
( f o r  exam p le ,  th rou gh  l e a r n i n g ) ,  w h i l e  new o n es  e m e r g e .  The 
s o lu t io n  space undergoes continuous tran s fo rm a t ion s ,  sh r in k in g  in  
one d i r e c t i o n ,  e x p a n d in g  in  a n o t h e r .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  
i m p l e m e n t e r ' s  l e f t  h an d  m ust be p r o b i n g  c o n s t a n t l y  t h e  
f e a s i b i l i t y  boundary, w h i le  h is  r i g h t  hand t r i e s  t o  a s sem b le  th e  
v a r i o u s  programme com ponents . T h is  s o r t  o f  ad hoc ,  t r i a l - a n d -  
e r r o r  s ea rch in g  f o r  a p o s s i b l e  s o lu t i o n  i s  a f a r  c r y  from  th e  
d e l i b e r a t e  p r o c e d u r e s  s u g g e s t e d  by th e  p l a n n in g - a n d - c o n t r o l  




























































































In  th e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t o  s tu dy  p o l i c y  im p le m e n ta t io n  i s  t o  
study the  e v o lu t io n  o f  p o l i c y  id eas .  The more g en e ra l  an id e a  ad 
th e  more a d a p ta b le  i t  i s  t o  a range  o f  c ircumstances, the more 
l i k e l y  i t  i s  t o  be r e a l i s e d  in  some form, but the  l e s s  l i k e l y  i t  
i s  t o  emerge as in te n d e d  in  p r a c t i c e .  The more r e s t r i c t e d  the 
id ea ,  and the more i t  i s  c o n s t r a in e d ,  th e  more l i k e l y  i t  i s  t o  
em erge  as p r e d i c t e d ,  b u t  t h e  l e s s  l i k e l y  i t  i s  t o  h a v e  a 
s i g n i f i c a n t  impact. A t one extreme we have the  id e a l  t y p e  o f  th e  
p e r f e c t l y  preformed p o l i c y  id ea ;  i t  on ly  r e q u ir e s  execu t ion , and 
the on ly  problems i t  r a i s e s  a re  th o s e  o f  c o n t r o l .  A t  th e  o th e r  
e x t r e m e ,  t h e  p o l i c y  i d e a  i s  o n l y  an e x p r e s s i o n  o f  b a s i c  
p r in c ip l e s  o r  a s p i r a t io n s ,  a matter f o r  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  r e f l e c t i o n  
and p o l i t i c a l  debate . In  between, where we l i v e ,  i s  a s e t  o f  more 
o r  l e s s  d e v e l o p e d  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  e m b e d d e d  i n  p i e c e s  o f  
l e g i s l a t i o n  , cou rt  d e c is io n s ,  and bureaucra t ic  p lans . Th is land 
o f  p o t e n t i a l i t y  i s  th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  im p le m e n ta t io n  a n a l y s i s  
(Majone and W ildavsky, 1979:190).
Norm S e t t in g
L e t  us move back t o  th e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  th e  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s :  
agenda s e t t i n g  and prob lem  f o r m u l a t i o n .  S t u d e n t s  o f  agenda  
s e t t i n g  t r y  t o  u nders tand  not on ly  why the agenda —  th a t  i s  , 
the  l i s t  o f  problems to  which p o l i c y  a c t o r s  a re  p a y in g  s e r io u s  
a t t e n t i o n  - -  i s  composed as i t  i s  a t  any g iv en  t im e, but how and 
why i t  changes o ve r  time (Kingdon, 1984).
The i n t u i t i v e  answer t o  th e  f i r s t  q u e s t io n  seems t o  be t h a t  
po licy -m akers  must attempt to  s o lv e  the most u r g e n t  p rob lem s o f  
t h e  day  i f  t h e y  want t o  remain  in  o f f i c e .  But as we a l r e a d y  
po in ted  ou t, in t u i t i o n  i s  not always a r e l i a b l e  g u id e  in  p o l i c y  
a n a l y s i s .  C e r t a i n l y ,  some problems —  ex trem ely  high i n f l a t i o n ,  
n a tu r a l  c a l a m i t i e s ,  war —  f o r c e  t h e i r  way i n t o  t h e  p u b l i c  




























































































and unambiguous th a t  th ey  s e t  the agenda o r  determ ine t im in g  and 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  i n n o v a t i o n s .  For example, in  the  1950s the 
i s s u e  o f  p o v e r t y  i n  A m e r i c a  was a m in o r  o n e  i n  p u b l i c  
c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  I n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s ,  w i t h  l i t t l e  ch a n g e  in  t h e  
d i s t r ib u t i o n  o f  income, i t  became a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  p u b l i c  
p o l i c i e s  (G u s f ie ld ,  1981).
What had changed were  a t t i t u d e s  and v i e w s  on p o v e r t y ,  and 
b e l i e f s  in  the  c a p a c ity  o f  government to  f in d  s o lu t io n s  t o  s o c ia l  
p rob lem s .  As C h a r le s  Murray w r i t e s ,  " [ t ] h e  e m e rg e n c e  o f  th e  
s t r u c t u r a l  v iew  o f  the p o ve r ty  problem was unexpected and ra p id .  
A t the beg inn ing  o f  1962, no one was t a l k i n g  about p o v e r t y ;  by 
th e  end o f  1963 i t  was th e  h o t t e s t  domestic p o l i c y  t o p i c  o th e r  
than c i v i l  r i g h t s .  But i t  was not ju s t  " p o v e r t y "  t h a t  was b e in g  
t a l k e d  ab ou t .  " S t r u c t u r a l  p o v e r t y "  was now the is su e "  (Murray, 
1984:27).
Hence i t  i s  problem r e c o g n i t io n ,  ra th e r  than the mere e x is te n c e  
o f  " p r o b l e m s " ,  w h ic h  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  a g en d a  s e t t i n g .  The 
agreem en t t o  r e g a r d  a s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n  as an is s u e  f o r  pu b l ic  
debate and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t io n ,  ra th e r  than " t h e  way t h in g s  a r e "  , 
p re su pposes  a p r e l im in a r y  agreement about norms o r  standards o f  
what i s  m ora l ly  and p o l i t i c a l l y  a ccep tab le .  A p o l i c y  problem i s  a 
c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  does  n o t  meet some s ta n d a rd s :  p o v e r t y  i s  no t  a 
problem f o r  a s o c i e t y  which b e l i e v e s  t h a t  th e  p oo r  a r e  a lw ays  
w i th  us, o r  th a t  th ey  g e t  p r e c i s e l y  what they  deserve  (Anderson, 
1979).
The common v i e w  t h a t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i s  p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  
s e t t in g  g oa ls  and f in d in g  the means t o  a ch ieve  the  d e f in ed  g o a ls ,  
ob scu res  th e  c r u c i a l  im portan ce  o f  problem r e c o g n i t i o n .  But as 
our examples suggest ,  the  most s i g n i f i c a n t  fu n c t i o n  o f  p o l i c y ­
m a k in g  i s  s e t t i n g  t h e  norms t h a t  d e t e r m in e  when c e r t a i n  




























































































norm s e t t i n g  i s  more b a s i c  than g o a l  s e t t i n g .  The emphasis on 
g o a l  s e t t i n g  d e r i v e s  f r o m  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t a l  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  
r a t i o n a l i t y  as g o a l - d i r e c t e d  b e h a v i o u r .  A c c o rd in g  t o  t h i s  
c o n c e p t io n ,  r a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  a n a l y s i s  canno t b e g i n  u n t i l  t h e  
r e l e v a n t  v a lu e s  have been s t ip u la t e d  e i t h e r  by an a u th o r i t a t i v e  
po licymaker or  through the a gg rega t ion  o f  c i t i z e n  p r e f e r e n c e s  in  
the p o l i t i c a l  p rocess .
In  f a c t ,  these  va lues  are  n e i th e r  g iv en  nor con s tan t ,  bu t o f t e n  
a re  th e m s e lv e s  a fu n c t i o n  o f  the po licy -m ak ing  p rocess  they  are 
supposed t o  gu ide. Thus, many o f  the prob lem s th a t  a d e m o c ra t ic  
government i s  expected  to  cons ider  today, from sex d is c r im in a t ion  
to  insurance aga in s t  s ickness and unemployment, were not regarded 
as p o l i c y  p r o b le m s  a c e n t u r y  o r  so  a g o .  And f o r  th e  l o n g -  
e s ta b l is h e d  p o l i c y  concerns, l i k e  the r e l i e f  o f  extrem e p o v e r t y ,  
t h e  norms h a ve  r a d i c a l l y  changed . Y e t  th e  p r o c e s s  t h a t  has 
m o d i f i e d  th e  norms i s  th e  same h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s  t h a t  th o s e  
norms have guided (V ick e rs ,  1965).
Far from w a i t in g  p a s s iv e ly  f o r  the s t ip u la t io n  o f  p u b l i c  v a lu e s  
t o  be s e r v e d ,  p o l i c y  a n a ly s t s  and academ ic s c h o la r s  are o f t e n  
deep ly  in v o lv e d  in  th e  n o r m - s e t t in g  p r o c e s s .  Fo r  exam ple ,  th e  
p o l i c y  i n n o v a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t e d  by p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  laws w i th  
c l e a r  g oa ls  and t im e ta b le s  to  a ch ieve  them (such as th e  Am erican  
1970 C lean  A i r  A c t  and the  1972 Federa l Water P o l lu t io n  Contro l 
A c t )  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n f lu e n c e d  by  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  " a g e n c y  
c a p tu r e "  p rop os ed  by p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  and economists more 
than a decade  e a r l i e r .  T h e s e  s c h o l a r s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  v a g u e  
s t a t u t o r y  la n g u a g e  had l e d  t o  th e  c a p tu r e  o f  th e  r e g u l a t o r y  
agenc ies  by business . The growth o f  b r o a d ly  d e l e g a t e d  a u t h o r i t y  
and in c r e a s e d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  d i s c r e t i o n  had corrupted  l ib e r a l i s m  
in to  a system o f  c om p e t i t ion  among i n t e r e s t  groups  and redu ced  
th e  power o f  th e  e l e c t o r a t e .  The p rop osed  remedy was s ta tu te s  




























































































and empower c i t i z e n  g r o u p s  t o  ta k e  s low -m ov in g  a g e n c ie s  t o  
cou rts .  As p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  Marver Bernste in  argued, s t a t u t e s  
o f  t h i s  ch a ra c te r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e  the sentiments o f  the  c i t i z e n s  
o r i g i n a l l y  m ob i l is ed  f o r  th e  purpose  o f  s e t t i n g  th e  agenda and 
p a s s in g  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n .  Armed w i th  s t r i c t  l e g a l  a u th o r i t y ,  a 
r e g u l a t o r y  a g e n c y  i s  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  d e c l i n e  and  p e r f o r m  
in a d e q u a t e l y ,  even  i f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  no lon ge r  command gen era l  
in t e r e s t  o r  a t t e n t io n  (B ern s te in ,  1955; Lowi, 1969).
Th e  i d e a s  o f  B e r n s t e i n ,  L ow i , and o t h e r  s c h o l a r s  w e r e  
in co rpo ra ted  in  i n f l u e n t i a l  tex tbooks and were e v e n tu a l ly  adopted 
by  t h e  U .S .  C on g ress  in  th e  p o p u la r i s e d  v e r s i o n  p r o v id e d  by 
members o f  th e  Ra lph  Nader o r g a n i s a t i o n  (M a rcu s ,  1 9 8 0 ) .  The 
r e s u l t  was a r a d ic a l  r e s e t t in g  o f  norms r e l a t in g  to  environmental 
and h ea lth  p r o t e c t i o n .  Judged by the new norms, th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
r e g u l a t o r y  s t r u c t u r e  - -  b a sed  on in fo r m a l  n e g o t i a t i o n  w i th  
indu s try ,  weak enforcement by s t a t e  agenc ies ,  and a la r g e  measure 
o f  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  d i s c r e t i o n  —  suddenly appeared inadequate and 
prone to  co r ru p t ion .  A major s h i f t  from d e c e n t ra l i s e d  r e g u l a t i o n  
and v o lu n t a r y  compliance toward r e g u la t io n  a t  the  n a t io n a l  l e v e l  
by means o f  l e g a l l y  en fo rc eab le  environmental s tandards  was th e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  response to  the new norms.
Assess ing  F e a s i b i l i t y
F o cu ss in g  a t t e n t i o n  on a p rob lem atic  c on d it ion  and s e t t i n g  the 
norms to  eva lu a te  th a t  c on d it ion  and the f a c t s  r e l e v a n t  t o  i t  are 
o n l y  th e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  in  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  p u b l ic  d e l i b e r a t i o n .  
The pu rpose  o f  th e  n e x t  s t a g e  o f  d e l i b e r a t i o n  i s  t o  f a s h i o n  
mutual u n d e rs ta n d in g s  about th e  b ou n d a r ie s  o f  th e  p o s s ib le  in  
p u b l ic  p o l i c y .  Here too  p o l i c y  an a ly s is  can p la y  a c r u c i a l  r o l e ,  
f i r s t  by  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  r e l e v a n t  c o n s t r a i n t s  and then  by 
d e v is in g  methods f o r  removing o r  t a k in g  ad van tage  o f  them when 




























































































The conven t iona l  wisdom about the r o l e  o f  knowledge and an a ly s is  
in  th e  p o l i c y  p r o c e s s  has been a p t l y  summarised as f o l l o w s :  "A 
p rob lem  e x i s t s ;  i n f o r m a t i o n  o r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  i s  n e e d e d  t o  
genera te  a s o lu t io n  to  the problem or to  s e l e c t  among a l t e r n a t i v e  
s o l u t i o n s ;  r e s e a r c h  p r o v i d e s  t h e  m i s s in g  k n o w l e d g e ;  t h e  
d e c i s i o n m a k e r s  th e n  r e a c h  a s o l u t i o n "  (W e i s s ,  1977: 5 3 3 ) .  
However, the r e la t i o n s h ip  between  know ledge  and p o l i c y  i s  much 
more s u b t l e  and i n d i r e c t .  Know ledge ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e o r e t i c a l  
knowledge, p lays  mainly a n ega t iv e  o r  c r i t i c a l  r o l e  in  p r a c t i c a l  
a f f a i r s :  i t  t e l l s  the p r a c t i t i o n e r  what cannot, ra th e r  than what 
can, be done. S c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s  do n o t  t e l l  e n g in e e r s  how t o  
a c h ie v e  p a r t i c u l a r  g o a l s ,  f o r  exam p le ;  r a t h e r ,  th e y  show why 
c e r t a i n  g o a l s  a re  im p o s s ib l e  in  p r i n c i p l e .  The second  law  o f  
thermodynamics shows the im p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  c on s tru c t in g  an engine 
th a t  w i l l  o p e r a t e  w i th  100 p e r c e n t  e f f i c i e n c y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a p e r p e tu a l  m ot ion  machine, which has f i r e d  the 
im ag ination  o f  so many v i s i o n a r i e s  and c ranks  in  th e  p a s t ,  i s  
ru led  out by the  law o f  conse rva t ion  o f  energy.
E n t i r e  b r a n c h e s  o f  p h y s i c s  a r e  b a s e d  on v e r y  g e n e r a l  
im p o s s ib i l i t y  p r in c ip l e s  o r  "p o s tu la te s  o f  impotence", and i t  has 
been argued t h a t  a l l  p h y s i c a l  s c i e n c e  and perhaps  a l l  n a tu r a l  
s c i e n c e  c o u ld  some day be d e r i v e d  from  a sm a l l  number o f  such 
p o s t u l a t e s .  "A p o s t u l a t e  o f  im p o te n c e " ,  S i r  Edmund W h i t t a k e r  
w r i t e s ,  " i s  not the d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  an experiment, o r  any f i n i t e  
number o f  exper im ents ; i t  does n o t  m ention  any measurement, o r  
any n u m e r i c a l  r e l a t i o n  o r  a n a l y t i c a l  e q u a t i o n ;  i t  i s  th e  
a s s e r t i o n  o f  a c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  a l l  a t t em p ts  t o  do a c e r t a i n  
th in g ,  however made, are bound t o  f a i l "  (W h ittaker ,  1958: 69 ).
A p o s tu la te  o f  im po tence  c o d i f i e s  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  p r a c t i c a l  
e x p e r i e n c e  in  which something has been attempted by many rou tes  
and a l l  o f  them have r e s u l t e d  in  f a i l u r e .  The p o s tu la t e  supposes 




























































































thus sa v e s  us from  w a s t in g  t im e  on i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s  l i k e  th e  
perpe tua l  motion machine.
In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  p h ys ic a l  im p o s s ib i l i t i e s  a re  not v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
from  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  in  th e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  l i k e  the " la w "  o f  
supply and demand, the maxim th a t  no one can f u l l y  c o n t r o l  th e  
b e h a v io u r  o f  a l a r g e  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  o r  th e  p r i n c i p l e  th a t  the 
l a r g e r  an o rga n isa t io n  becomes, th e  weaker i s  th e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  
i t s  a c t i v i t i e s  e x e rc is ed  by those a t  the top .  The obviousness o f  
these  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  does n o t  reduce  t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e ;  and 
a l t h o u g h ,  l i k e  th e  p o s t u l a t e s  o f  im potence  in  p h y s i c s ,  th e y  
cannot be proved , to  d is rega rd  them would be c o u r t in g  d i s a s t e r .
U n fo r t u n a t e l y ,  in  p o l i t i c s  the tendency t o  equate the  d e s i r a b le  
w i th  th e  f e a s i b l e  i s  b o th  more common and more d i f f i c u l t  t o  
c o r r e c t  than in  sc ien ce  and techno logy .  Rent c o n t r o l  i s  a c l a s s i c  
exam ple .  A l th ou gh  th e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  r e n t s  i s  t o  
p r o t e c t  th e  consumer from  th e  s k y r o c k e t in g  in c r e a s e s  in  ren ts  
th a t  accompany a housing shortage ,  the long-run e f f e c t  i s  t o  make 
a lm os t  e v e r y o n e  w orse  o f f  by d i s c o u r a g in g  th e  c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  
r e n ta l  apartments and th e  upkeep o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k ,  w h i l e  
e n c o u r a g in g  t h e  abandonm ent o f  o l d  h o u s in g  u n i t s  o r  t h e i r  
convers ion  in to  o f f i c e  space in  o rd e r  t o  e s cap e  c o n t r o l s .  These 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  have  been known f o r  some t im e ,  y e t  a number o f  
c i t i e s  th a t  had abandoned r en t  c o n t r o l  during the 1950s began  t o  
r e i n s t i t u t e  t h i s  measure w ith  the i n f l a t i o n  o f  the  1970s.
F a i l u r e  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  th e  p e r v a s iv e n e s s  o f  c o n s t r a in t s  a l s o  
a ccou n ts  f o r  th e  common tendency t o  see power everywhere and to  
e x p l a i n  p o l i c y  ou tc om es  e x c l u s i v e l y  as t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
d e l i b e r a t e  a c t io n s  o f  powerfu l in d iv id u a ls  and groups. A c tu a l ly ,  
po licym akers  are  o f t e n  l e s s  powerfu l and d e c i s i v e  than  th e y  a re  




























































































powerfu l p o l ic ym a k e r  one must b e g in  by m ark ing  ou t th e  l i m i t s  
upon h is  s p e c i f i c  powers.
The American p res idency  i s  c e r t a i n l y  one o f  th e  most p o w e r fu l  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  the  world . Y e t ,  as Richard Neustadt w r i t e s ,  " th e  
P r e s id e n t 's  advantages are checked  by th e  a d van tages  o f  o t h e r .  
C o n t in u in g  r e la t i o n s h ip s  w i l l  p u l l  in  both d i r e c t i o n s .  These are 
r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  mutual dependence. A P re s id en t  depends upon th e  
men he would  persuade; he has to  reckon w ith  h is  need o r  f e a r  o f  
them. They too  w i l l  possess s ta tu s ,  o r  a u t h o r i t y ,  o r  b o th ,  e l s e  
they  would be o f  l i t t l e  use to  him. Th e ir  vantage po in ts  c on fron t  
h is  own; t h e i r  power tempers h is "  (Neustadt, 1963:44).
In  a s s e s s in g  the power o f  a po licym aker, many o th e r  l im i t s  must 
a l s o  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  c o n s i d e r a t i o n :  p r i o r  p o l i c i e s  a n d  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n e r t i a ;  i n a d e q u a t e ,  o u t d a t e d ,  o r  b i a s e d  
in fo rm a t ion ;  the p lans o f  o th er  po l icym akers  and th e  r e s i s t a n c e  
o f  o n e 's  own b u rea u c ra cy ;  v e s t e d  i n t e r e s t s  and the demands and 
a s p ir a t io n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s o c i a l  g rou p s ;  l i m i t s  on th e  span o f  
c o n t r o l  and on t h e  a v a i l a b l e  t im e  and r e s o u r c e s ;  a u t h o r i t y  
l e a k a g e  and l o s s  o f  l e g i t i m a c y ;  f o r e i g n  c o m m itm e n ts  and 
in t e rn a t io n a l  p ressures .  While most o f  these  c o n s t ra in ts  w i l l  not 
be so t i g h t  as t o  a l l o w  th e  p o l ic y m a k e r  no le ew a y  th e y  a re  o f  
s u f f i c i e n t  s i g n i f i c a n c e  th a t  ign o r in g  them w i l l  cause s e r iou s  and 
sometimes d isa s trou s  consequences (Majone, 1989).
In  some ca s e s  c o n s t r a in t s  a re  n o t  ign o red  but are  in c o r r e c t l y  
gauged . Fo r  exam ple ,  in  d eb a te s  a b o u t  s o c i a l  p o l i c y  p u b l i c  
o p in io n  i s  o f t e n  d i v i d e d  o v e r  q u e s t io n s  o f  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  w i th  
con se rva t iv e s  o v e r s t a t in g  and p r o g r e s s i v e s  u n d e r e s t im a t in g  th e  
con s t ra in ts  on c o l l e c t i v e  a c t io n .  An important p a r t  o f  the jo b  o f  
p o l i c y  an a lys ts  and c r i t i c s ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  i s  to  improve the  q u a l i t y  
o f  p u b l i c  d e l i b e r a t i o n  by h e lp in g  po licym akers  and the  genera l  




























































































o v e r s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  on th e  p o s s i b l e  in  p u b l i c  
p o l i c y .  A com peten t  f e a s i b i l i t y  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  a new p o l i c y  
p r o p o s a l  must i d e n t i f y  the major ac tua l o r  p o t e n t ia l  c o n s t ra in ts  
( in c lu d in g  p o l i t i c a l  and a d m in i s t r a t i v e  o n e s ) ,  e v a lu a t e  t h e i r  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  im p lem en ta t ion  s t r a t e g i e s ,  separa te  
r e a l  c o n s t r a in t s  from  f i c t i t i o u s  o b s t a c l e s ,  and e s t im a t e  th e  
c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  o f  those  con s tra in ts  th a t  are  not a b s o lu te ly  
f i x e d .
The l a t t e r  t a s k  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im portan t s in ce  th e  a n a ly s t 's  
j o b  i s  n o t  o n l y  t o  c a l c u l a t e  o p t im a l  s o l u t i o n s  w i t h i n  g i v e n  
c o n s t ra in t s ,  but a ls o  to  push out the boundaries o f  the  p o s s ib l e .  
Doing th i s  r e q u ir e s  both o b j e c t i v e  an a ly s is  and p e r s u a s io n .  What 
i s  p o s s i b l e  w i t h in  g i v e n  c o n s t r a in t s  o f t e n  depends on what the 
p o l i t i c a l  system cons iders  f a i r  o r  a ccep tab le .  Hence many p o l i c y  
c o n s t r a in t s  can be eased on ly  by changing va lu es ,  a t t i t u d e s ,  and 
c o g n i t i v e  b e l i e f s .  Here th e  work o f  th e  p o l i c y  c r i t i c  i s  a t  
l e a s t  as important as th a t  o f  the ana lys t .  When assess ing  p o l i c y  
f e a s i b i l i t y  i t  i s  n o t  a lw a y s  e a s y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e tw e e n  
immovable c o n s t r a in t s  and those th a t  can be r e la x e d  by changing 
a t t i tu d e s  and va lu es ,  o r  by d evo t in g  s u f f i c i e n t  r e s o u rc e s  t o  th e  
t a s k .  U n l ik e  p h ys ic a l  im p o s s ib i l i t i e s ,  p o l i c y  f e a s i b i l i t y  i s  not 
an o b j e c t i v e  p r o p e r t y  bu t depends on such  f a c t o r s  as t i m e ,  
r e s o u r c e s ,  s k i l l ,  m o t i v a t i o n ,  and im ag ina t ion . For example, in  
t h e  s h o r t  run  t e c h n o l o g y ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  m anpower, and ( i n  t h e  v e r y  s h o r t  r u n )  e v en  
a d m in is t ra t iv e  rou t in es  and p ro ced u res  must be taken  as g i v e n .  
W ith  s u f f i c i e n t  t im e  and m o t iva t ion ,  however, t e c h n o lo g i c a l  and 
in s t i t u t i o n a l  o b s ta c le s  can be removed, laws r e v i s e d ,  c a p a c i t i e s  
in creased ,  procedures changed, and new s k i l l s  changed.
F i n a l l y ,  i t  wou ld  be wrong t o  th in k  o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  o n l y  as 
l i m i t s  on o n e 's  power and freedom  o f  c h o i c e .  By s k i l l f u l  and 




























































































them . In  f a c t ,  l e a r n i n g  d ep en d s  t o  a l a r g e  e x t e n t  on th e  
i n t e l l i g e n t  e x p lo i t a t i o n  o f  c o n s t ra in ts .  Because a w o r ld  f r e e  o f  
c o n s t r a in t s  would be t o t a l l y  ch a o t ic  (q u i t e  l i t e r a l l y ,  anyth ing 
could  happen), organisms can lea rn  and adap t o n l y  t o  th e  e x t e n t  
th a t  t h e i r  environment i s  constra in ed ;  once a c o n s t ra in t  has been 
recogn ised  th ey  can u su a l ly  take advantage o f  t h i s  knowledge.
The f a m i l i a r  phenomenon o f  f r i c t i o n  i s  a good example o f  how a 
c o n s t r a in t  may tu rn  ou t  t o  b e ,  a t  l e a s t  in  some r e s p e c t s ,  a 
b le s s in g  in  d is g u is e .  To mechanical eng ineers  f r i c t i o n  rep resen ts  
a p e r va s iv e  and c o s t l y  l im i t a t i o n .  A t the same t im e, f r i c t i o n  i s  
h i g h l y  d e s i r a b l e  in  c e r t a in  circumstances. Without i t  the  wheels 
o f  a ca r  would sk id  in s tead  o f  r o t a t in g ;  we c o u ld  n o t  w a lk  w i th  
o r d i n a r y  s h o e s ,  bu t wou ld  need s u c t io n  pads t o  c l i n g  t o  th e  
f l o o r ;  and kn o ts  would be i n e f f e c t i v e  s i n c e  i t  i s  f r i c t i o n  
between th e  in t e r lo c k in g  p a r ts  o f  the knot th a t  ho ld  i t  t o g e th e r .  
For a s im i la r  example from the world  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  c o n s id e r  
th e  c o n s t r a in t s  imposed on industry  by environmental and h ea lth  
r e g u la t io n .  R egu la tory  r e s t r i c t i o n s  have u n dou b ted ly  in c r e a s e d  
p roduction  c o s ts  in  the  sh o r t  run and may have caused th e  lo s s  o f  
jobs  in  some marginal f i rm s .  However, some c o u n t r i e s  have taken  
a d v a n t a g e  o f  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  c o n s t r a in t s  and d e v e lo p e d  a new 
industry  ex p o r t in g  p o l lu t io n - c o n t r o l  te ch n o lo g ie s  and equ ipm ent.  
I n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  a ban on t h e  use  o f  
c h l o r o f lu o r o c a r b o n s  in  n o n e s s e n t i a l  a e r o s o l  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  
combined w i th  s t r o n g  consumer p r e s s u r e ,  has s t im u la ted  product 
in n ova t ion .  The in ven to r  o f  the  f i r s t  workable a e r o s o l  v a l v e  was 
a b le  t o  p r e s e n t  h is  d e v i c e  ju s t  one day a f t e r  the Environmental 
P ro t e c t io n  Agency and the Food and Drug A d m in i s t r a t i o n  p rop osed  
t h e i r  ban in  May 1977!
To c o n c lu d e ,  p o l i c y  f e a s i b i l i t y  may be a n a l y s e d  f r o m  tw o  
d i f f e r e n t  but complementary p e r s p e c t iv e s .  On the  one hand, o v e r l y  




























































































t o  do som eth ing  i n h e r e n t l y  im p o s s ib le  i s  a lw ays  a c o r r u p t in g  
e n t e r p r i s e ,  as p o l i t i c a l  p h i l o s o p h e r  M i c h a e l  O a k s h o t t  on ce  
o b s e r v e d .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, s h o r t - ru n  c o n s t r a in t s  should not 
become conven ien t excuses f o r  p a s s iv e ly  a ccep t in g  the s ta tus  quo. 
As I  have s u g g e s t e d  ab ove ,  in  many ca s e s  th e  boundary o f  th e  
p o s s ib le  in  p u b l ic  p o l i c y  can be pushed ou t  by d e v i s i n g  methods 
o f  r e la x in g  c o n s t ra in ts  o r  le a rn in g  how to  use them c r e a t i v e l y .
Conceptual Innovat ion  and P o l i c y  Change
P r o b a b l y  t h e  m ost  d i f f i c u l t  p rob lem  f a c i n g  th e  s tu d e n t  o f  
po l icy -m ak ing  i s  e xp la in in g  the dynamics o f  p o l i c y  d eve lop m en t .  
P o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t s  have t r a d i t i o n a l l y  exp la in ed  p o l i c y  change 
as t h e  r e s u l t  o f  s h i f t s  i n  t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  d o m in a n t  
i n t e r e s t s ,  o r  o f  changes in  econom ics  o r  t e c h n o lo g y .  However, 
more r e c en t  s tu d ie s  d ea l in g  w ith  such im p o r ta n t  exam ples  as th e  
a d o p t io n  o f  K eyn es ian  p o l i c i e s  in  Europe and in  America in  the 
1940s and 1 9 5 0 s ,  t h e  m o n e t a r i s t  and s u p p l y - s i d e  c o u n t e r ­
r e v o l u t i o n s  o f  the  1970s and 1980s, the r i s e  o f  environmentalism  
and consumerism , and th e  d i f f u s i o n  o f  t h e  d e r e g u l a t i o n  and 
p r i v a t i s a t i o n  movements, g e n e ra l ly  r e j e c t  monocausal exp lana t ions  
and suggest  in s tead  th a t  an adequate model o f  p o l i c y  change must 
a ls o  in c lude  conceptual innovations  and id e o l o g i c a l  change.
Th is  new l i t e r a t u r e  r e f l e c t s  a g row in g  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  what 
used t o  be c a l l e d  the supers tructu re  has a c o n s id e rab le  autonomy 
w ith  r e sp e c t  to  s h i f t i n g  c o n s t e l l a t i o n s  o f  power and in t e r e s t s  in  
s o c i e t y .  The e v id e n c e  s u g g e s ts  t h a t  th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  s p e c i a l  
in t e r e s t s  has been o f t e n  o v e r r a t e d  and t h a t  th e  " im age  o f  th e  
s t a t e  as a k ind  o f  b i l l i a r d  b a l l ,  pushed around by com pe t in g  
in t e r e s t  groups" (H a l l ,  1986:17) i s  g r o s s ly  in a ccu ra te .  Accord ing  
t o  t h e  o l d e r  t h e o r i e s  o f  " r e g u l a t o r y  c a p t u r e " ,  f o r  exam p le ,  
i n t e r e s t  groups in f lu en ce  the outcome o f  th e  r e g u l a t o r y  p r o c e s s  




























































































p o l i t i c i a n s  and r e g u la to r s .  Y e t ,  from a s e r i e s  o f  case s tu d ies  o f  
American r e g u la to r y  agenc ies  James Wilson concludes th a t  "o n ly  by 
the most e x t ra o rd in a ry  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n t o r t i o n s  can one e x p la in  
t h e  A u to  S a f e t y  A c t ,  t h e  1964 C i v i l  R ig h t s  A c t  . . .  o r  most 
environmental p r o t e c t io n  laws by r e fe r e n c e  to  the  economic stakes 
in vo lv ed "  (W ilson , 1980:372).
S i m i l a r l y ,  in  none o f  th e  ca s e s  o f  d e r e g u l a t i o n  s t u d i e d  by 
D e r t h i c k  and Q u irk  d id  th e  r e g u la t e d  i n d u s t r i e s  d e c id e  t h a t  
r e g u la t io n  was no lon ge r  in  t h e i r  in t e r e s t ;  nor was the d e fe a t  o f  
th e  r e g u la t e d  in d u s t r i e s  brought about p r im a r i ly  by o th e r  w e l l -  
o rgan ised  groups th a t  s tood t o  ga in  from r e fo rm .  In s t e a d ,  th e s e  
a u th o rs  a rgue  t h a t  th e  r e g u la to r y  reforms o f  the  l a t e  1970s and 
e a r l y  1980s would  n e v e r  have o c c u r r e d  w i th o u t  t h e  s u s t a i n e d  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  c r i t i q u e  o f  prev ious  r e g u la to r y  p o l i c i e s  developed 
by economists in  the  p reced ing  decade (D er th ick  and Quirk, 1985). 
A c c o r d in g  t o  an o th e r  s c h o la r ,  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  d e r e g u la t i o n  o f  
l o n g - d i s t a n c e  t e le c o m m u n ic a t io n s "  was dom ina ted  by c h a n g in g  
id e o lo g y ,  not changing techno logy .  I t  was id eas ,  not th in g s ,  th a t  
u rged  on th e  a c t o r s  a t  c r i t i c a l  p o in t s  in  th e  c o n t e s t s  o v e r  
t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  p o l i c y  and AT&T 's o r g a n i s a t i o n "  (Tem in , 
1987:7 ).
I t  would  be eq u a l ly  d i f f i c u l t  t o  ass ign  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  to  
in t e r e s t - g r o u p  pressures  in  the p r i v a t i s a t i o n  movement in  G rea t  
B r i t a in .  The fundamental r e d i r e c t i o n  o f  pu b l ic  p o l i c y  e f f e c t e d  by 
the Thatcher government s in ce  1979 has been e x p l i c i t l y  based on a 
m ix o f  A u s t r i a n  and n e o - c l a s s i c a l  m a rk e t  t h e o r i e s ,  and on 
l i b e r t a r i a n  va lues  (Helm, 1989).
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  ideas  in  p o l i c y  change can su rp r is e  on ly  the 
advocates o f  a clumsy rea l ism  which holds th a t  ideas  on ly  r e f l e c t  
i n t e r e s t s  o r  l e g i t i m i s e  p o w e r .  In  f a c t ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  o f  




























































































c o n d i t i o n s ,  p o l i t i c a l  c l im a t e ,  and s o c i e t a l  v a lu e s ,  depends 
c r u c i a l l y  on th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  a r i c h  p o o l  o f  t h e o r i e s  and 
i d e a s .  The e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  o f  id e a s  shapes t h e i r  r e s p o n s e  t o  
even ts  by d e f in in g  the  conceptual a l t e r n a t i v e s  from  among which 
th e y  ch o o s e .  On what c on d it ion s  w i l l  the production  o f  new ideas 
be in ten se  o r  s low , o r  more in t e n s e  in  one p o l i c y  a r e a  than in  
a n o t h e r ?  Why a r e  some p r o p o s a l s  a c c e p t e d  w h i l e  o th e r s  a re  
r e j e c t e d  o r  i g n o r e d ?  In  s h o r t ,  how i s  c o n c e p tu a l  i n n o v a t i o n  
l in k ed  t o  p o l i c y  development?
To pose such quest ions  i s  t o  suggest tha t  p o l i c y  development may 
be a n a l y s e d  as t h e  ou tcom e  o f  a dua l p r o c e s s  o f  c o n c e p tu a l  
innova t ion  and o f  s e l e c t i o n  by p o l i t i c a l  a c to rs  from th e  p o o l  o f  
a v a i l a b l e  p o l i c y  v a r i a n t s .  The p o l i t i c a l  arena i s  th e  locus  o f  
s e l e c t i o n ,  w h i le  the locus o f  conceptual innova t ion  may be c a l l e d  
t h e  p o l i c y  com m un ity  (M a jo n e ,  1989 ).  A p o l i c y  community i s  
composed o f  p e o p le  who sha re  an a c t i v e  i n t e r e s t  in  a c e r t a i n  
p o l i c y  o r  s e t  o f  r e l a t e d  p o l i c i e s :  p o l i c y  p la n n e rs ,  a n a ly s ts ,  
p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  a cadem ics ,  i n t e r e s t - g r o u p  e x p e r t s  and m ed ia  
s p e c i a l i s t s .  The members o f  a p o l i c y  com m un ity  r e p r e s e n t  
d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s ,  ho ld  d i f f e r e n t  va lu es ,  and pursue d i f f e r e n t  
g o a l s ,  b u t  t h e y  a l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  p o l i c y  d e v e l o p m e n t  by 
g en e ra t in g  and deba t ing  new ideas and p ro p o sa ls .
O th e r  w r i t e r s  have used d i f f e r e n t  l a b e l s  t o  e x p r e s s  s i m i l a r  
concepts . Hugh H e c lo ,  f o r  exam ple , speaks o f  " i s s u e  n e tw o rk s "  
ra th e r  than p o l i c y  communities. L ike  a p o l i c y  community, an issue 
network i s  a shared-knowledge group having to  do w ith  some aspect 
o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y .  More than mere t e c h n i c a l  e x p e r t s ,  n e tw ork  
p e o p le  a r e  p o l i c y  a c t i v i s t s  who know each  o t h e r  t h r o u g h  th e  
is su es .  As Heclo observes ,  i t  i s  in c r e a s in g ly  through networks o f  
peop le  who regard  each o ther  as knowledgeable th a t  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  
i s s u e s  ten d  t o  be r e f i n e d ,  e v id e n c e  d e b a te d ,  and a l t e r n a t i v e  




























































































c o m m u n i t y )  t i e s  t o g e t h e r  w h a t  w o u ld  o t h e r w i s e  b e  t h e  
c o n t r a d ic to r y  t e n d e n c ie s  o f ,  on th e  one hand, more w id e sp rea d  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  in  p u b l ic  p o l i c y  and, on the  o th e r ,  
more narrow  t e c h n o c r a t i c  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  i n  c o m p le x  modern 
p o l i c i e s  (H e c lo , 1978: 103-104).
Although some members o f  a p o l i c y  community o r  i s s u e  ne tw ork  
may a ls o  be p o l i t i c a l  a c to r s ,  the two r o l e s  are  d i s t i n c t .  A v o t e r  
c h o o s in g  i n  a r e f e r e n d u m  o r  a p o l i c y m a k e r  c h o o s in g  among 
d i f f e r e n t  o p t i o n s  does no t  c on tr ib u te  to  conceptual innova t ion ;  
ra th e r ,  he a c ts  a s a mechanism f o r  s e l e c t i n g  from  th e  p o o l  o f  
a v a i l a b l e  v a r i a n t s .  The whole p o l i t i c a l  p rocess ,  in  f a c t ,  may be 
th ou gh t  o f  as a l a r g e  s e l e c t i o n  mechanism t h a t  p i c k s  ou t  f o r  
a c c e p ta n c e  th o s e  o f  th e  com pe t in g  p o l i c y  id e a s  which in  some 
sense b e s t  meet the  demands o f  the p o l i t i c a l  environment.
The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  w i l l  depend 
c r u c i a l l y  on th e  r a t e  and q u a l i t y  o f  c o n c e p tu a l  i n n o v a t i o n .  
W ith ou t  a continuous stream o f  new proposa ls  s e l e c t i o n  w i l l  have 
n o th in g  t o  work on. In  tu rn ,  th e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  new i d e a s  
depends on p o l i t i c a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s .  For  exam ple ,  
u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  c r i t i c s  o f  s o c ia l  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c i e s  in  th e  U n ited  
S t a t e s  and Europe la c k e d  a d i s c ip l in a r y  and o r g a n is a t io n a l  base 
through which a c c e s s  t o  th e  r e l e v a n t  p o l i t i c a l  a rena  c o u ld  be 
s e c u re d .  Economists w r i t in g  on s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  issues  b e fo r e  the 
1960s e i t h e r  were ou ts id e  the mainstream o f  t h e i r  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
t h e i r  in t e r e s t  was r e a l l y  d i r e c t e d  a t  d i f f e r e n t ,  broader issues  -  
-  K eyn es ian  e c o n o m is t s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  who th o u g h t  o f  s o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  p r i m a r i l y  as an in s t ru m en t  o f  f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  S o c i a l  
s e c u r i t y  e x p e r t s  and t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  s u p p o r t e r s  c o u ld  e a s i l y  
d i s r e g a r d  c r i t i c i s m s  f r o m  i n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r t s  who l a c k e d  
widespread p r o fe s s io n a l  su ppo rt  (D e r t h i c k ,  19 7 9 ) .  A l l  t h i s  has 
ch a n g ed  w i t h  t h e  r e c u r r e n t  f i n a n c i a l  c r i s e s  o f  th e  s o c i a l  




























































































c l im a t e  o f  o p in io n  about th e  p ro p e r  r o l e  o f  government in  the 
economy, have s t im u la t e d  a much more s u s t a in e d  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
e f f o r t  by e c on om is ts  and o ther  ana lys ts  to  deve lop  more o r  l e s s  
r a d ic a l  proposa ls  t o  re form  the p resen t system.
As t h i s  exam ple  shows, la ck  o f  access t o  the  app rop r ia te  forum 
may, by i t s e l f ,  be a se r iou s  o b s ta c le  to  the  p roper c o n s id e ra t ion  
o f  new p o l i c y  id eas .  Systematic  development and e va lu a t io n  o f  new 
p r o p o s a ls  i s  im p o s s ib l e  w i th o u t  o r g a n is e d  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
c r i t i c a l  d e b a te .  The p o l i c y  community must be s u f f i c i e n t l y  open 
so t h a t  t r u l y  n o v e l  v a r i a n t s  may e m e rg e .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  
s e l e c t i o n  can be e f f e c t i v e  o n l y  where the community i s  not too  
open. I f  each and e ve ry  proposa l were taken s e r io u s ly ,  the  burden 
f o r  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  m echan ism s would soon become u n b e a ra b le ,  
le a d in g  t o  a breakdown o f  e v a lu a t iv e  c r i t e r i a .  On ly  some o f  th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  c o n c e i v a b l e  proposa ls  can become a c t i v e  t o p ic s  o f  
debate and p o l i c y  innova t ion  a t  any g iv en  t im e .  A new id e a  must 
be ju d g e d  n o t  by i t s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  m er it  a lone ,  but by in q u ir in g  
how i t  might c on tr ib u te  to  the ongoing d eb a te . Th is i s  one o f  the 
important tasks o f  the  p o l i c y  c r i t i c .
P o l i c y  Eva luat ion
The debate through which c r i t e r i a  o f  e va lu a t ion  and standards o f  
a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  a re  e s t a b l i s h e d  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  t h e  
p r o c e s s  o f  p o l i c y  development. Ana lys ts  have c on tr ib u ted  to  t h is  
d eb a te  in  a number o f  ways, bu t e s p e c i a l l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  new 
s u b d i s c i p l i n e  o f  e v a l u a t i o n  r e s e a r c h .  T h i s  i s  a l a r g e  and 
expanding area o f  p o l i c y  an a ly s is  devoted to  c o l l e c t i n g ,  t e s t in g ,  
and i n t e r p r e t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  im p le m e n ta t io n  and 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  e x i s t i n g  p o l i c i e s  and p u b l i c  programmes. The 
purpose  i s  t o  d i s c o v e r  who b e n e f i t s  and who lo s e s  from a g iv en  
p o l i c y ,  whether the p o l i c y  i s  a c c o m p l is h in g  what was in t e n d e d ,  




























































































Many p r o f e s s i o n a l  e v a lu a t o r s  seem t o  assume t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  
p u r e l y  e m p i r i c a l  d e te rm ina t ions ,  in v o lv in g  n e i th e r  va lue  cho ices  
nor persona l op in ions .  In f a c t ,  va lues  and op in ions  count a g r e a t  
d e a l  in  e v a l u a t i o n  n o t  o n ly  because  o f  th e  a m b ig u i ty  o f  th e  
outcomes o f  p r a c t i c e  - -  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  a s s i g n in g  s p e c i f i c  
causes  t o  p a r t i c u la r  e f f e c t s ,  o f  measuring outputs and assess ing  
u n in ten ded  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  o f  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  b e tw e e n  f l a w e d  
c o n c e p t i o n s  and f a i l u r e s  o f  im p lem en ta t ion  - -  bu t even  more 
because o f  inescapab le  disagreements about the kind o f  e v a lu a t iv e  
standards th a t  are  meaningful, f a i r ,  o r  p o l i t i c a l l y  a ccep tab le  in  
a g iv en  s i tu a t io n .
Thus, p r o f e s s i o n a l  e v a lu a t i o n  ten ds  to  merge w ith  the genera l  
process  o f  c r i t i c i s m  and a p p r a i s a l  o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s  t o  which 
a l l  p o l i t i c a l l y  a c t i v e  members o f  a d e m o c r a t i c  com m unity  
c on tr ib u te  in  d i f f e r e n t  bu t e q u a l l y  u s e fu l  ways. P o l i c i e s  and 
p o l i c y  instrum ents  are  c on s tan t ly  assessed, ex ante and ex pos t ,  
from the d iv e r s e  c r i t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  l e g i s l a t o r s ,  ju d g e s ,  
programme m anagers, im p lem en t in g  bureaucra ts ,  i n t e r e s t  groups, 
in d ep en d en t  e x p e r t s ,  th e  m ed ia , and p r i v a t e  c i t i z e n s .  T h es e  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  are  d i f f e r e n t  both because e v a lu a t iv e  c r i t e r i a  va ry  
w ith  the r o l e  and p o s i t i o n  o f  the e va lu a to r  and because d i f f e r e n t  
e v a lu a t o r s  tend t o  focus t h e i r  a t t e n t io n  on d i f f e r e n t  aspects  o f  
the po l icy -m ak ing  p rocess .  General standards o f  per fo rm ance  l i k e  
l e g a l i t y ,  l e g i t i m a c y ,  economy, e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  e f f i c i e n c y ,  and 
respons iveness  to  p u b l ic  needs are  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  
t h e  d i s t i n c t  r o l e s  o f  ju d g e s ,  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  b u dge t  o f f i c e r s ,  
p u b l ic  a c co u n ta n ts , and consumers o f  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s  o r  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  M o reo v e r ,  some c r i t e r i a ,  such as 
e f f i c i e n c y  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  apply p r im a r i l y  t o  th e  ou tp u ts  o r  
outcomes o f  pu b l ic  p o l i c y ,  o th er  c r i t e r i a  ( f o r  in s tan ce ,  economy) 
apply t o  the  inpu ts ,  and o th e r  s t i l l  ( l e g a l i t y ,  l e g i t i m a c y )  t o  




























































































T h i s  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  e v a l u a t i v e  s t a n d a r d s  and  c r i t i c a l  
p e r s p e c t i v e s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  c o m p le x i t y  o f  p o l i c y - m a k in g  in  a 
p l u r a l i s t i c  s o c i e t y .  Even p r o fe s s io n a l  e v a lu a t o r s  now r e c o g n i s e  
t h a t  t h e i r  work becomes r e le v a n t  on ly  in  the broader c o n te x t  o f  
competing c r i t e r i a  and ev idence  p resen ted  by v a r i o u s  a c t o r s  and 
i n t e r e s t  g rou p s .  The new s lo g a n  i s  "m u lt ip le  e v a lu a t io n " .  This 
exp ress ion  acknowledges the le g i t im a c y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c r i t e r i a  and 
p e r s p e c t i v e s ,  bu t a l s o  s u g g e s t s  th e  need t o  r e a ch  a l e v e l  o f  
u n d e r s t a n d in g  t h a t  i s  more th a n  th e  sum o f  t h e  s e p a r a t e  
e v a lu a t io n s .
The danger o f  p l u r a l i s t i c  e va lu a t ion  i s  th a t  the c o n c lu s io n s  o f  
an e va lu a t io n  done f o r  use in  a p a r t i c u la r  r o l e  are assumed t o  be 
e q u a l l y  r e l e v a n t  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  o t h e r  r o l e s  w i t h  
d i f f e r e n t  e v a l u a t i v e  c r i t e r i a .  Because r o l e s  and c r i t e r i a  are 
m ism a tch ed ,  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  a r e  a lm o s t  
i n e v i t a b l y  found wanting. Examples o f  mismatched c r i t e r i a  abound. 
Many e va lu a t ion s  o f  pu b l ic  programmes have a narrow  m a n a g e r ia l  
f o c u s ,  b e in g  con ce rn ed  w ith  goa l  achievement and a d m in is t r a t iv e  
c o n t r o l  ra th e r  than w ith  the respons iveness  o f  th e  programme t o  
th e  d i v e r g e n t  va lues  o f  d i f f e r e n t  in d iv id u a ls  and groups . Such a 
narrow p e r s p e c t iv e  n e g le c ts  a more s t ru c tu ra l  a n a ly s is  o f  changes 
in  s o c i e t a l  va lues  and o f  the a b i l i t y  o f  bureaucracy to  adapt to  
such changes. In  tu r n ,  programme managers o f t e n  f e e l  t h a t  th e  
s t r e s s  p la c e d  by many e v a lu a t i o n  s tu d i e s  on e f f e c t i v e n e s s  and 
e f f i c i e n c y  i s  in  c o n f l i c t  w i th  such b a s i c  v a lu e s  as em p loyee  
p a r t i c ip a t i o n ,  persona l development, and h igh morale. O thers, f o r  
example h ea lth  p r o fe s s io n a ls ,  quest ion  how econom ic  r a t i o n a l i t y  
should be balanced a ga in s t  p r o fe s s io n a l  standards.
I s  t h e r e  a c u r e  f o r  such  common t e n d e n c i e s  t o  c o n f o u n d  
e v a l u a t i v e  r o l e s  o r  t o  mismatch c r i t e r i a ?  P r o b a b ly  n o t .  A t  a 
minimum, how ever ,  e f f o r t s  t o  b u i l d  a c r i t i c a l  c a p a c i t y  f o r  




























































































e x p l i c i t l y  r e c o g n i s e  t h a t  m u l t i p l e  r o l e s  e x i s t ,  e a c h  w i t h  a 
l e g i t im a t e  c la im  to  s e t  e v a lu a t iv e  c r i t e r i a .
Another d i f f i c u l t y  which exper ts  and c i t i z e n s  a l i k e  must fa c e  i s  
th e  i n e v i t a b l e  c o n f l i c t  between crude but i n t u i t i v e l y  appea ling  
c r i t e r i a  on t h e  one hand , and more r e f i n e d  b u t  a l s o  more 
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  c r i t e r i a  on the o th e r .  This c o n f l i c t  may not have 
been so se r iou s  once. As G e o f f r e y  V i c k e r s  (1965 ) has o b s e r v e d ,  
t h e r e  have been t im es  in  th e  n o t - s o - d i s t a n t  p a s t  when popular 
expec ta t ion s  were r e l a t i v e l y  c l e a r ,  r e a l i s t i c  and v e r i f i a b l e  - -  
th e  m a in tenance  o f  law  and o r d e r ,  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a in s t  f o r e i g n  
agg ress ion ,  a s ta b le  currency, a s ta b le  l e v e l  o f  t a x a t io n ,  r e l i e f  
o f  e x t r e m e  p o v e r t y .  T o d a y  we e x p e c t  much more f r o m  ou r  
government, but we do not know p r e c i s e l y  how any government could  
f u l f i l l  our exp ec ta t ion s .  A t the  same tim e, change has become so 
rap id  th a t  the past becomes an e v e r  l e s s  r e l i a b l e  g u id e  t o  th e  
f u t u r e .  Thus, p o l i c y  outcomes become in c r e a s in g ly  e lu s iv e  both 
because we are  le s s  c e r t a in  about the l i m i t s  o f  th e  p o s s i b l e  in  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  and because  we su s p e c t  t h a t  th e  most im p o r ta n t  
r e s u l t s  may not y e t  have had time t o  appear.
Accord ing to  s o c i a l  p s y c h o lo g is ts ,  le a rn in g  i s  the dominant form 
in  which  r a t i o n a l i t y  e x h i b i t s  i t s e l f  in  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  g r e a t  
c o g n i t i v e  c o m p l e x i t y .  Th is  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  
p u b l i c  p o l i c y -m a k in g  depends more on im p ro v in g  t h e  l e a r n i n g  
c a p a c i t y  o f  th e  v a r i o u s  o rgans  o f  p u b l i c  d e l i b e r a t i o n  than on 
maximising achievement o f  p a r t i c u l a r  g o a l s .  P o l i c y  c r i t i c s  can 
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  s o c i e t a l  l e a r n in g  by r e f i n i n g  th e  s tan d a rd s  o f  
ap p ra isa l  and by encouraging a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s  than i s  p o s s i b l e  from a s in g l e  p e r s p e c t iv e .  
The need t o d a y  i s  l e s s  t o  d e v e l o p  " o b j e c t i v e "  m ea su res  o f  
outcomes —  the t r a d i t i o n a l  aim o f  e va lu a t ion  research  —  than to  
f a c i l i t a t e  a w ide-rang ing  d ia logu e  among a d v o c a te s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
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